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Abstract 
This article builds on the author’s research concerning the role of collective memory in identity-
based conflicts, as well as his practical work as the co-director of the Imagine Center for Conflict 
Transformation and as a trainer and facilitator with various Azerbaijani-Armenian dialogue 
initiatives. It is not a comprehensive study of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but presents a 
general overview of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, what has contributed to its failure, 
and which areas require major rethinking of conventional approaches.  The discussion does not 
intend to present readers with a set of conclusions, but to provide suggestions for further critical 
research.   
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What makes the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict1 intractable? Why did 15 years of negotiation 
fail to produce any results? What is the state of research and scholarship on this conflict? Is there 
adequate literature available to understand and resolve the conflict? Can a better understanding of 
the conflict lead to the development of a more efficient peace process? 
This article attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the major factors contributing to 
the continuation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. It assesses whether the current peace process 
adequately addresses these factors and suggests ways to make the peace process more effective.  
Until now, the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) peace process has been limited to official 
negotiations between the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh and the return or exchange of territories. In other words, the process has been focused on 
interests. In recent years, however, Rothman and Olson (2001), among other scholars, have argued 
that such an interest-based approach “can be an appropriate method of resolution in conflicts where 
resources and interests are the only issues at stake.” Furthermore, Rothman and Olson established 
that when conflict involves identity-based issues, such as conflicting perceptions of history, 
“negotiated settlements have only rarely been able to end wars effectively. ...Bargaining over those 
issues [interests] without prior and adequate attention first to identity issues has the effect of further 
polarizing the parties” (Kelman 1995).   
This article argues that the political process itself has been mismanaged. There are a large 
number of stakeholders whose interests require lasting peace, yet these interests are rarely 
understood and articulated, and their potential for resolving the conflict is underutilized. In addition 
to politics, there are other factors that influence the conflict. Specifically, the conflict has a strong 
                                               
1 In this article, the author discusses not only the conflict over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the 
dynamics of the larger clash between the Azerbaijani and Armenian societies. The term ‘Armenian-Azerbaijani’ 
conflict is employed when referring to this broader dynamic and the term ‘Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’ is used 
when referring specifically to the territorial issue.   
identity component that manifests itself in deep mutual mistrust rooted in hostile historical 
memories. The identity needs of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, however, are neglected in the current 
official Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The policymakers and negotiators hardly even 
acknowledge the presence of such a factor. The road to resolution, however, requires them to address 
the underlying identity fears along with the interests of the parties involved. The Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict is intractable not because its root causes cannot be resolved, but rather because 
they have hardly been understood or articulated, let alone addressed.  
This article is divided into three parts; the first presents the structure of the argument and the 
conflict. The second part examines Armenian and Azerbaijani identities and their roles in the 
conflict, asserting that it is largely an identity-based conflict rooted in deep mistrust and animosity 
between the two societies. Here, we examine the relationship between the most commonly held 
historical narratives in present-day Armenian and Azerbaijani societies and identify those elements 
of collective memory that contribute to the continuation of the conflict. After exploring the role of 
historical memory in the conflict, both on the political and societal level, this section offers 
suggestions for addressing the underlying identity needs. 
The third part examines the political process. It questions whether the current peace process, 
limited to the political level, is the most efficient format for resolving the conflict. It argues that this 
protracted conflict has many dimensions other than political and that its resolution requires a 
comprehensive long-term strategy aimed at improving the relations between the two societies, where 
the official negotiations alone are inadequate. A stakeholder analysis shows that improved relations 
and a sustainable peace between Armenians and Azerbaijanis would better serve most of the actors’ 
interests. It stands to reason that any long-term, comprehensive peace process would have to be 
designed in accordance with the interests of the major stakeholders. An analysis of stakeholder 
interests helps to identify the actors who are genuinely concerned with a sustainable peace and can 
serve to locate resources and supporters during the implementation of the peace process. Moreover, 
political analysis can expose obstacles to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including 
its potential spoilers, as well as outline ways for limiting their influence or transforming them into 
actors interested in peace.  
The fourth and final part examines the main trends in existing scholarship and literature on 
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and its resolution. This part does not represent an in depth review 
of literature, but rather an attempt to group together the major themes as well as point out the areas 
that need further research. The scholarship on this conflict is divided into goal-oriented and process-
oriented approaches. The goal-oriented writings, constituting the bulk of the scholarship, are divided 
into three major trends based on their preferred final solution to the status of NK.  
Writers who focus on the process of conflict resolution rather than the outcome represent a 
new and growing trend in the literature. This trend, if developed, can transform the thinking about 
resolutions to the NK conflict and generate the knowledge necessary to achieve a breakthrough. In 
the conclusion, the article outlines a few key areas in which the scholarship on this conflict, as well 
as the political process, needs to be developed  to find a lasting solution. 
 
Structure of the Conflict 
From 1918 until 1920, independent Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war over Nagorno-
Karabakh (Artsakh in the Armenian language) that weakened both and made them easy targets for 
the advancing Red Army. After the Sovietization of the Caucasus, the NK territory was transferred 
back and forth between Armenia and Azerbaijan several times. In 1923, Stalin, as part of his ‘divide 
and rule’ policy, placed the overwhelmingly Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh in 
Azerbaijan, creating dissatisfaction among Armenians.  He also gave the NK autonomous status, 
thus dissatisfying the Azerbaijanis. By some accounts, Stalin personally drew the Nagorno-
Karabakh’s borders “so as to leave a narrow strip of land separating it physically from Armenia” 
(Walker 1991). 
With some exceptions,2 Armenian-Azerbaijani relations were calm during the Soviet period. 
The recent phase of the conflict over what was then called the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Oblast (NKAO), a small region of 1,699 sq mi (4,400 sq km) with a population of 186,100 (based on 
the Soviet census of 1989), began in 1987 when Gorbachev’s glasnost created some room for 
popular expressions of grievances. Armenians in Armenia and in NKAO organized rallies that 
gathered hundreds of thousands of people demanding the unification of Armenia and NKAO. In 
February 1988, the soviet (parliament) of the NKAO passed a resolution by a vote of 110-17 
requesting secession from the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and its incorporation into 
the Armenian SSR (Libaridian 1988). The move provoked Azerbaijan to revoke Nagorno-
Karabakh’s autonomous status. 
Both sides accused each other of beginning the violence. The Soviet leadership proved 
incapable or unwilling to manage the crisis. By violently repressing some peaceful demonstrations, 
such as the one in Baku on 20 January 1990, it contributed to further radicalizing the conflicting 
parties. By the time the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, the crisis had transformed into a full-scale 
war between independent Azerbaijan and its autonomous entity, Nagorno-Karabakh, the latter 
enjoying the full support of independent Armenia, including direct involvement of the Armenian 
army. In 1994, after three years of fighting, a ceasefire brokered by the Russian government was 
established, leaving most of Nagorno-Karabakh proper and the surrounding Azerbaijani territories 
                                               
2 In 1964 2,500 Karabakh Armenians sent a petition to Khrushchev with a detailed description of discrimination 
that they were facing at the hands of the Azerbaijani government and asked for re-incorporation of autonomy 
into the Armenian SSR. Their petition was ignored.  
under Armenian control. As a result of the war, casualties amounted to 25,000-30,000, with 250,000-
350,000 refugees from Azerbaijan in Armenia, and 750,000-1,000,000 refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied Azerbaijani territories in 
Azerbaijan (Moradian and Druckman 1999;  www.hrw.org)  
Structure of the Peace Process 
 The Nagorno-Karabakh peace process has been largely limited to official negotiations. Track 2 
work and civil society involvement have been extremely limited. The conflict resolution process is 
also remarkable for the absence of comprehensive scholarship on the topic. The political process is 
well developed, the parties are actively involved in negotiations and  there is never a shortage of 
international mediators. However, Crocker, Hampson and Aall (2004) characterize this conflict as a 
“captive–intractable” conflict that “suffers from too much attention from the wrong quarters. …[It] 
is fueled … by entities that are not direct parties to the conflict [but who] make it possible for it to 
continue.” Attempts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began soon after the onset of the war 
in 1991 with the failed Russian-Kazakstani peace plan. In 1992, Iran tried to broker a ceasefire. The 
same year, the Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE), later the Organization 
for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), established the Minsk Group to work directly with 
the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents. Russia, despite being the chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, 
pursued an independent path, unilaterally brokering a ceasefire in 1994 (Croissant 1998) and using 
this opportunity to assert its influence over the region. Armenians accepted the Russian offer 
because Russia was their close and powerful ally; Azerbaijan accepted it because Russia was the 
only country that had enough leverage to pressure Armenians to stop their offensive.  
 Despite the success in brokering a ceasefire, the Russians proved incapable or unwilling to 
mediate a permanent peace agreement and, by many allegations, became the main obstacle to the 
resolution of the conflict (De Waal 2003). At least three times, in 1997, 1999 and 2001, the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders came close to an agreement, but were never able to sign it. Every 
possible solution -- from various forms of autonomy, through confederation, independence, power-
sharing and territorial swap-- had been on the negotiating table. Great powers, as well as some 
smaller states,3 have tried to mediate this conflict. The OSCE Minsk group was transformed in 1997 
when the US and France became co-chairs with Russia. Despite the efforts and 15 years of 
negotiation, the conflict has not been resolved, no agreement has been reached, and no mutually 
acceptable solution has been articulated.  
Identity  
The formation of the present day Armenian identity is an important contributing factor in the 
conflict. Armenians trace their ancestry to the sixth century B.C. According to Suny, their identity 
was consolidated as a “unique, identifiable, ethno-religious community when they adopted an 
exclusive form of Monophysite Christianity and a common language in the fourth century A.D.” 
(Suny 1993). For some brief periods of its history, Armenia was an independent state, but for the 
most part it was dominated by different empires--Roman, Persian, Byzantine, Arab, Mongol, 
Ottoman, Russian and Soviet.  
The Armenian popular narrative often refuses to acknowledge Azerbaijanis as a distinct ethnic 
group. They fully associate the Turkic speaking Azerbaijanis with Turks.4 According to the 
Armenian narrative, ancestors of the present-day Turks and Azerbaijanis played a devastating role in 
Armenian history. They invaded the region along with other Turkic tribes in the 10th through 12th 
centuries and have been responsible for innumerable massacres and the colonization of indigenous 
peoples, including Armenians. This historic injustice culminated in the Armenian Genocide of 1915 
                                               
3 Italy and Sweden 
4 In fact, it is commonplace not to use the word ‘Azerbaijani’ among Armenians, but to use the term ‘Turks’ 
instead. 
in Ottoman Turkey, in which the entire Armenian population of Anatolia was destroyed. 
(Hovannisian 1988). Recent research and polls show that most Armenians believe that the memory 
of the genocide contributes to the Armenian national identity along with the language, culture and 
history (www.acnis.am). In the Armenian collective memory, the Turkic speaking Azerbaijanis are 
considered part of the “genocidal” Turkish nation, responsible for massacres, ethnic cleansings and 
the destruction of Armenian culture. As a consequence, Armenians fear a genocide of the Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians, should NK become part of independent Azerbaijan. The nationalistic public 
rhetoric of the Azerbaijani authorities often directly calls for war and ethnic cleansing.5
 
 The current 
policy of supporting Turkey’s denial of the Armenian genocide does not discourage those 
perceptions.  
Nagorno-Karabakh has a particular importance for the Armenian collective memory. According 
to some Armenian historians, Nagorno-Karabakh, unlike the rest of Armenia, has always remained 
autonomous or independent (Hovannisian 1988). Armenians in other regions were assimilated, but in 
Nagorno-Karabakh they preserved their identity. This notion has become a major component of the 
Armenian collective memory in the last decade, contributing to the perception of Nagorno-Karabakh 
as the “last Armenian stronghold,” the “surrender” of which will result not only in the loss of 
territory but in the loss of a big part of the Armenian identity. 
The formation of the Azerbaijani identity is another factor contributing to the intractability of the 
conflict. Azerbaijanis trace their ethnic ancestry from the aboriginal Caucasian Albanians and the 
Turks. The Azerbaijani cultural traditions are mainly those of Shi’a Islam (Croissant 1998). By some 
accounts, Azerbaijani identity consolidated in the 17th-19th centuries, while others trace it as a 
                                               
5 As it is often remembered in Armenia, the then Azerbaijani President Elchibey was quoted as saying in June 
1992, "If there is a single Armenian left in Karabakh by October of this year, the people of Azerbaijan can hang 
me in the central square of Baku." 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo970701/text/70701-19.htm   
distinct identity group going back to the 10th century or earlier (Atabaki 2000). This discrepancy 
might have to do with the fact that the Muslim groups in the Ottoman and Persian Empires, although 
they had many distinct features such as culture and language, did not have a tradition of describing 
themselves in present-day ethnic terms and had one overarching Muslim identity. After the Russians 
conquered the Caucasus, people who lived in contemporary Azerbaijan and were part of the Muslim 
majority in Muslim empires suddenly became a religious minority in an Orthodox Christian state.  
According to the Azerbaijani narrative, Armenians play a very destructive role in the history of 
Azerbaijan. Tsarist Russia employed policies of assimilation and relocated large numbers of 
Christians, mostly Armenians, to the region populated by Azerbaijanis, simultaneously deporting 
Muslims from the same areas. Russians also favored local Christians, particularly Armenian 
Christians, who assumed political and economic control. The Azerbaijani collective memory also 
contains examples of 1918 Russian massacres of Azerbaijanis that Armenians participated in. At that 
time, the Azerbaijani identity was also consolidated and defined in ethnic terms, reinforced by the 
ideology of Pan-Turkism, a secular form of Turkic nationalism. Azerbaijani (or Azeri) identity, 
although it developed in protest to Russian (Christian) policies and colonization, was mainly directed 
against the local ‘privileged’ Christian Armenians (Atabaki 2000).
  
Armenians were seen as 
opportunistic aggressors that used their good relationship with Russia to expand into Azerbaijani 
territories in the east. The Russian-Armenian military alliance and the continuing presence of the 
Russian army in the Caucasus reinforced this perception. 
Just as in the Armenian case, Nagorno-Karabakh has a special place in the Azerbaijani collective 
memory. It is remembered as the birthplace of Azerbaijani identity, the center of Azerbaijani culture 
and the home to many Azerbaijani poets and musicians. The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh equated to 
the loss of a big part of national identity.  
In the last two decades, since the onset of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1988, the 
Azerbaijani and Armenian historical narratives have grown increasingly hostile, each portraying its 
own group as indigenous and peaceful. The other has become the archenemy who methodically 
destroys their population and cultural heritage with the help of the assimilatory and discriminatory 
policies of the dominant powers, Russia and Turkey respectively. Both narratives blame any possible 
past or present tragedy exclusively on the other group, be it injustice or misfortune, genocide, the 
destruction of cultural heritage the start of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, ethnic cleansings resulting in 
hundreds of thousands of refugees or economic disaster. Both consider the other’s historical 
accounts to be lies, manufactured for political purposes. This mutual perception has grown so hostile 
that any compromise or concession, particularly related to the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, is now 
seen as humiliating, defeatist and unacceptable to either side. 
The current Armenian and Azerbaijani governments have risen to power on radical nationalistic 
slogans with mutually exclusive claims to deliver Nagorno-Karabakh to their respective 
constituencies. Every politician who takes a moderate stand and tries to improve relations is 
inevitably stamped as a traitor. This dynamic creates a vicious cycle of political outbidding in which 
politicians are forced to take more and more radical positions so as not to appear unpatriotic 
compared to the opposition. This war of rhetoric, produced mostly for internal consumption, forces 
the leaders on both sides to adopt an increasingly radical stance vis-à-vis the other side. It widens the 
gap between the positions of the two parties and leaves little room for a solution. Even worse, the 
rhetoric penetrates the media and educational institutions, gradually transforming them into 
propaganda machines. Entire generations have been raised on this propaganda during the 20 years of 
conflict. It has intensified the feeling of mutual mistrust and hatred, while elevating the mutually 
exclusive myths of Nagorno-Karabakh to such a level that no politician can suggest any concession 
without producing public outrage. The polarization of public opinion is so deep that if the leaders of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan could reach an agreement, they would likely fail to implement it because of 
the fear of making such agreements public.6 The current negotiation effort, therefore, is something of 
a farce since any possible solution that would determine the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh would 
be dissatisfactory to at least to one party and likely both. Both sides refuse to acknowledge any need 
to cooperate until a solution is found, and each side wants that solution to satisfy its own demands.  
The above analysis shows that the collective memories and identities of Azerbaijanis and 
Armenians have developed in opposition to each other and the “us versus them” dynamic is central 
to defining relations between the two societies. A meaningful peace process intended to achieve a 
lasting solution should approach the identity dimension of the conflict as seriously as the political 
one. It must develop a long-term comprehensive strategy to promote reconciliation between the two 
societies.  
Developing a detailed list of specific recommendations for working with identities does not fall 
within the scope of this article. However, a few general suggestions can be made that require further 
examination. There is a need for an in-depth study of the agents of transmission of historical 
memory with an aim to understand the role of these agents in influencing Azerbaijani-Armenian 
relations, on both the political and societal level. The following questions should be asked: what is 
the exact role of historical educational materials, and electronic and printed media in shaping policy? 
How can school curricula and media be transformed into factors contributing to the resolution rather 
than exacerbation of conflicts? Can a better understanding of the relationship between memory and 
                                               
6 Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian and many of his allies were forced to resign by the Armenian 
military shortly after he announced publicly the decision of his government to sign an agreement with 
Azerbaijan that would compromise the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. According to ICG report, in 2001 
president Heidar Aliev secretly agreed for a territorial ‘swap’, but it caused his foreign policy adviser and his 
foreign minister to resign and organize protest demonstrations, forcing Aliev to back out.  
conflict be used to produce less dichotomous policy-making? How can this knowledge help improve 
Armenian-Azerbaijani relations? 
Based on this research, a long-term strategy can be developed to work with the identity 
dimension of the conflict. The strategy should be sustainable and should focus on attracting 
resources from actors who have interests in peace in the region, rather than depending on the good 
will of traditional donors whose support may be short-term and limited. Specific initiatives must 
have a long-term vision. The strategy should develop a network of researchers and educators, which 
would provide channels of dialogue and cooperation on various levels, including official ones, so 
that it may catalyze larger social change and sustainable peace. Resource centers should be 
established to provide the people and organizations involved with the necessary skills, networks and 
educational materials for grassroots work. These centers should also secure ways of keeping network 
members connected over long periods of time. 
 
Politics: Stakeholders and their Interests 
The Azerbaijani and Armenian governments have been negotiating since 1994, yet they have 
never signed an agreement. Fifteen years of failure have led to skepticism within Armenian and 
Azerbaijani societies as well as in the international community about the possibility of resolving this 
conflict. This stalemate has created a widespread assumption that resolution is simply not in the 
interests of the political actors and that they only pretend to negotiate while benefiting from the 
conflict. We start by challenging this skepticism and analyzing the interests of the main and 
secondary stakeholders. Our analysis will show that improved relations between the Azerbaijanis 
and Armenians and lasting peace are in the interest of the overwhelming majority of the 
stakeholders. The Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of NK, the populations of the Republics 
of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the governments of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, the 
Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDP) from the regions other than NK are considered here to be the primary stakeholders.  
The Armenian economy is suffering enormously from the status quo. It is left out of all the 
regional integration and cooperation projects. Continuing confrontation with Azerbaijan and its ally 
Turkey decreases its security and increases its dependency on Russia. The process of democratic 
reforms is stagnant and most of its educated youth are leaving the country. Azerbaijan, in turn, is 
deprived of the shortest land link with its closest ally and economic partner, Turkey. Nakhichevan, 
the autonomous region of Azerbaijan that is separated from the rest of the country by Armenia, is 
completely isolated from the world and suffers from economic hardship; hundreds of thousands of 
refugees and IDPs live in refugee camps and cannot return to their homes. The continuing 
confrontation with Armenia and presence of the Russian Army decreases the security level. 
Improving relations would not only resolve these vital problems, but would also increase 
cooperation with the entire region, as well as the United States and the European Union. Armenia 
and Azerbaijan might even be considered for EU accession, something that both countries aspire 
towards.  
Conversely, if the current level of mutual mistrust persists, then any potential solution will fall 
short of the governments’ maximalist promises to create strong opposition and will endanger their 
power. The status quo might be convenient in the short term, but in the long term will show that the 
governments are unable to deliver on promised solutions. Armenia will deepen its dependence on 
Russia and will be left out of regional cooperation opportunities. Azerbaijan’s land will continue to 
be occupied and almost a million IDPs will be unable to return, exacerbating the sense of insecurity 
among the population. The level of economic deprivation and sense of hopelessness for the future 
may lead to a new cycle of violence. This scenario is not in the interests of the political leaders 
either, as it is likely to further decrease their popularity and endanger their political future, though 
not as quickly as an unpopular solution would.  
To summarize, while short-term political calculations push governments to take radical and 
mutually exclusive positions, the long-term interests of Armenian and Azerbaijani people and both 
governments would be better served if relations improved and the needs of the other side  better 
understood. It would then be more acceptable for both governments to consider compromising on 
the NK’s status. It is therefore in the interests of the governments, if not to support, then to at least 
not hinder the cooperation between the two societies. Cooperation between the civil societies would 
increase the level of mutual trust, break down negative stereotypes and decrease the sense of 
insecurity. Only then could the negotiations addressing structural issues-- the return of occupied 
territories around Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, the return of most of the IDPs, and the status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh -- cease to be political suicide.  
More then a million Armenians and Azerbaijanis became refugees or IDPs as a consequence 
of the conflict. Intensive nationalistic propaganda has led them to believe that the final status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh will influence their future, and that the conflict cannot be resolved because of the 
other side. This creates extreme anti-Azerbaijani and anti-Armenian sentiments. Only 50,000 of the 
refugees and IDPs are from Nagorno-Karabakh; the other million are from Armenia and Azerbaijan 
proper and the Azerbaijani territories around NK that are under Armenian military control. Their 
return depends less on the final status of NK and more on the normalization of relations between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis, protection of minority rights in both countries and the return of the 
other Azerbaijani districts outside of NK. 
The Armenian leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh is often considered radical and uncompromising. 
But this is an assumption. The real problem is that they are primary stakeholders in the conflict and 
not present at the negotiating table. Their needs are neglected and their opinions are largely 
unknown. When looking at the interests of the NK Armenians, it is obvious that they require 
improved relations with Azerbaijan and a voice in the search for a solution, not the dangerous status 
quo and its possibility of a new war, 
Nagorno-Karabakh’s Azerbaijani community is fully uprooted and displaced and, just like the 
Armenian one, directly affected by the conflict. Improved relations between the societies would 
serve their long-term interests well and would allow the IDPs to return home safely. The needs of 
this community, as well as those of the Armenian community in NK are central to the conflict. Both 
must be integrated into the search for the solution should there be a hope for a lasting peace.  
The most important secondary stakeholders in the conflict are Russia, the US, Georgia, Turkey, 
the Armenian diaspora and the growing Azerbaijani diaspora. Some Western oil companies, like 
British Petroleum (BP) that recently invested billions into the Azerbaijani oil industry, may also be 
included (International Alerts Reports 2004).  NATO, the EU and some individual European 
countries are the other parties with stakes in the outcome and influence over its dynamics. 
After the Soviet Union broke up, Western attitudes toward the conflicts in the former Soviet 
republics were based on the desire for good relations with Russia and non-interference. Later, the 
general Western orientation of the South Caucasian republics, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
and the geopolitical importance of the region between Iran, Russia, Turkey and central Asia 
contributed to the decision by the US and the EU to increase their influence over the region.  
The oil resources of Azerbaijan have attracted the attention of the major Western oil companies. 
Initially, the pipeline transporting oil from the Azerbaijani capital Baku to the Turkish port Ceyhan 
was intended to go through Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia as a “peace pipeline” fostering regional 
cooperation and integration. The security risks, however, were too high, and the pipeline eventually 
went from Baku to the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and then Ceyhan (BTC pipeline), bypassing 
Armenia. As a result the pipeline created an economic alliance among Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey 
and the oil companies -- an alliance that was backed by Britain and the US. It left out Armenia, 
Russia, and Iran, thereby pushing them to seek closer ties with each other. Initially intended as a 
peacemaker, it only reinforced existing political divisions.  
Improving relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan would contribute to stability, security, and 
economic cooperation in the Caucasus, a region that seeks closer ties with the US, the EU and 
NATO, and is open to their influence and cooperation. The prospect of another war endangers the oil 
companies’ multibillion-dollar investments in the BTC pipeline. War would destabilize the 
possibility of regional cooperation and enable Russian armies to increase their presence in the 
Caucasus. This might provoke Iran to invade in order to prevent a spillover of the conflict into its 
territory.7 A new war would decrease Western and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and central 
Asia and could pave the way for the proliferation of radical Islam in Azerbaijan. Therefore, the US, 
NATO and the EU have a genuine interest in seeing Azerbaijani-Armenian relations improve. They 
can provide resources and political support for the implementation of a long-term strategy to 
improve Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.   
For the same reasons (oil security, regional stability, increased influence in the Caucasus), 
Turkey also has economic and security interests that favor an improvement of Armenian-Azerbaijani 
relations. After the first visit of a Turkish president to Armenia in September 2008, Turkey has 
actively tried to initiate Armenian-Azerbaijani talks, signaling its interest in being a mediator. It has 
                                               
7 Iran has a 20 million Azerbaijani minority that it suspects to have secessionist aspirations.  
also shown that it intends to cooperate rather than compete with other mediators, particularly Russia. 
A few days after the start of the Russian-Georgia war in 2008, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan 
suggested creation of the Caucasus Stability Pact, which would ally Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Russia, and Turkey.  
Politically, however, the Turkish government is not in good a position to support a reconciliation 
effort. The Armenian quest for recognition of the 1915 events as genocide in parliaments around the 
world is seen as hostile and intended to damage Turkey. Fear that recognizing the genocide would 
reinforce mistrust and could be followed by territorial claims and demands for reparations. Besides 
that, pro-Azerbaijani feelings are strong within the Turkish elite and public, which makes Turkey 
look biased towards Azerbaijan. Finally, in the last few years, Turkey has suffered internal political 
crises. A power struggle between its religious and military/nationalist elites has made any potentially 
unpopular move in handling the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict a big risk for any politician. Turkey, 
therefore, can be considered an actor interested in peace and cooperation in the Caucasus, but one 
that is likely to exercise caution.    
The interests of Georgia, which has tried to stay away from the conflict to not damage its 
relations with either party, also favor a lasting peace in the region. It is a neighboring country, with 
large Armenian and Azerbaijani minorities, two conflicts of its own, and a tense relationship with 
Russia. Georgia is looking for peace and stability in the Caucasus and increased cooperation with the 
West. Another war in Nagorno-Karabakh would increase Russian military presence in the Caucasus, 
destabilize the region, affect its economy, and might renew violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
If engaged more actively, Georgia could play a pivotal role in the improvement of Azerbaijani-
Armenian relations as a regional broker since it is interested in peace, has good relations with both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and would suffer greatly from the renewal of hostilities. 
Russia’s role and its presumed interest in prolonging rather than resolving the conflict was 
discussed above. The perceived decrease of its role in the region and the increasing influence of the 
West are the main reasons for its ambiguous attitude toward a lasting peace. Because Russia is a key 
player in the region and cannot be simply dismissed, the peace process should clearly signal that the 
economic and security interests of Russia would not be overlooked and the resolution of the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict would not invariably lead to their accession into NATO. Greater 
involvement of Russia in regional economic and security developments might help. Turkey's 
Caucasus Alliance proposal would create a regional security structure and has been welcomed by 
Russia.  
Additionally, Russian influence is largely conditioned by the necessity for Armenia to 
balance its economic and military isolation in the region. If Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and 
Turkey improved and Armenia were better integrated into regional economic and security projects, 
its dependence on Russia would greatly decrease. This would transform Russia’s role from a 
coercive to cooperative one.  
The main questions persist: If the improvement of relations is in the interest of most of the 
parties, then why is the conflict intractable? Is the current peace process adequate for resolving the 
core issues? Can the current format be improved or can a more comprehensive and effective peace 
process be developed?  
The above stakeholder and identity analyses reveal a number of shortcomings in the current 
format of the peace process. First of all, it is limited to the political level and all other components of 
the conflict, such as identity, are ignored. A second set of shortcomings is related to the political 
process itself. The Minsk Group was chaired initially by Russia, until France and the US joined as 
co-chairs in 1997. From the outset, the group has tried to broker a peace agreement between the 
governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian community and its 
leadership are the primary stakeholders to the conflict, but they are represented at the negotiating 
table by the president of Armenia. The latter fully supports them, yet does not have much control 
over the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh nor has enough legitimacy in the eyes of either the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians or the population of the Armenian Republic to sign any agreement 
without the explicit approval of the NK leadership. Moreover, from the start of the negotiations, all 
three of Armenia’s presidents have been consistently unpopular, often facing radical opposition at 
home. They would never have been able make major concessions or compromises, as it would equal 
political suicide. The NK leadership, to the contrary, is very popular, both in NK and in Armenia. If 
its needs are neglected, it has its own armed forces and enough popular support to sabotage the 
implementation of any agreement. Also, unlike the government of Armenia, it is in a better position 
to sign and honor an agreement, as it is seen as the legitimate representative of NK Armenians in 
Karabakh, Armenia and the diaspora. The presence of NK Armenians at the negotiation table is a 
necessary factor for signing and successfully implementing any peace agreement. 
Another deficiency of the negotiating process is the composition of the mediating group 
itself, consisting of official representatives from the US, France and Russia, all three of which are 
great powers with competing interests in the region. The US is is most actively trying to find a 
sustainable solution that will satisfy the needs of both parties and has the resources to provide 
incentives for them to cooperate. In fact, US interests seem to require a lasting peace and 
improvement of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. US oil companies invest in Caspian oil 
and a new war would endanger that. Also, an improvement of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations would 
lead to greater regional integration and likely increase US influence in this strategic Western-
inclined and NATO alliance-seeking region. Finally, both Armenia and Azerbaijan see the US as a 
relatively neutral force since the interests of its oil lobby8 and the Armenian lobby balance each 
other out. As a result, the US is acceptable as a mediator for both parties.  
France, so far, has chosen a passive stance toward the conflict and is hardly contributing to 
progress in negotiations. France’s oil giant, Total, owns 5% of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. 
The Azerbaijani side regards it suspiciously as a mediator because it has historically come across as 
a pro-Armenian actor with an influential Armenian diaspora. But pro-Armenian or not, France’s 
approach indicates that it is comfortable with the status quo and has little incentive to promote 
development, since it might require either Armenian or Azerbaijani concessions that would 
dissatisfy French-Armenians or its own oil lobby. France, therefore, has little incentive to actively 
broker any compromise.  
Azerbaijan also regards Russia as a pro-Armenian force. Until recently, however, Russia 
pursued its own interests by ensuring the continuation of the conflict, supporting both sides, rather 
than supporting one in any meaningful way. This instability allowed Russia to maintain a military 
presence in the region under the pretext of preventing a larger scale regional war that might involve 
Turkey or Iran, which would have lead to greater instability. Russian policymakers considered a 
stable peace likely to increase the influence of the US and the EU. It might even enable NATO to 
penetrate the south Caucasus, a move that Russia has been actively trying to prevent. The interests of 
Russia, therefore, favor a state of permanent conflict, rather than a sustainable peace or improved 
relations. Recently, Russia has changed its approach. While NATO has been slowly penetrating the 
former Russian sphere of influence, Turkey has been increasingly active in the Caucasus, leaving 
Russia little room to exercise influence. Under its new president, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia has 
shown signs of activating its role as a mediator and even hosting unilaterally mediated talks. Today, 
                                               
8 Chevron and ExxonMobil are investing heavily in Caspian oil. 
Russia seems to prefer a peace deal signed on its terms involving some stake in Caspian oil, a 
continuing military presence and economic dominance in the Caucasus. 
This controversial composition and interests of the mediating group hardly make it an 
effective vehicle for finding the best outcome. It should be acknowledged, however, that the 
negotiations mediated by great powers do have one major positive impact: for almost 15 years, they 
have kept the parties at the negotiating table and so far have prevented them from resorting to a new 
cycle of violence. Any change in the format of negotiations, including the composition of the 
mediating group, can lead to instability and renewed violence. The above criticism of the negotiation 
process, therefore, should not be regarded as a call to alter the current format. It rather points out the 
limitations of what is currently called the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and invites parties truly 
interested in peace and stability, be they governments, individuals, academic institutions, businesses 
or NGOs, to actively explore, develop and implement additional measures conducive to the 
resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.  
 
Politics: Suggestions 
As indicated earlier, one of the principal parties to the conflict, NK is not represented at the 
negotiating table, while the mediators themselves are viewed suspiciously and have conflicting aims. 
Nonetheless, it would be premature and quite dangerous to alter the political process. Firstly, even if 
it does not help to resolve the conflict, the current format prevents the two parties from resorting to 
violence. Secondly, the obstacles to a resolution are not limited to the political level and before 
making any changes to the process, it is necessary to address the other non-political obstacles 
analyzed in the identity section earlier. These societies are full of hatred and mistrust towards each 
other. A zero-sum vision of the conflict prevails; civil societies have a marginal role in conflict 
resolution and the opinions of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian and Azerbaijani people are 
neglected. No political agreement signed under such conditions is likely to be implemented 
successfully.  
As the analysis shows, most of the actors’ long-term interests require an improvement of 
relations and peace. Such an effort should become an integral part of the peace process. 
Strengthening democratic institutions and civil society and gradually involving Nagorno-Karabakh’s 
Azerbaijani and Armenian communities in the peace process are some examples of what could be 
done. Furthermore, it is evident that the educational systems and the media in both societies have a 
central role in disseminating hatred. They should be transformed from factors contributing to conflict 
into tools of conflict resolution. To balance the spoilers and extremists in politics or media, moderate 
actors should be supported and integrated into the mainstream. Many more factors that hinder the 
resolution of the conflict have to be identified, analyzed and addressed. 
Until now, conventional wisdom has suggested that the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh’s status 
has to be resolved before Armenian-Azerbaijani relations can be improved. Fifteen years of 
unfruitful negotiations over the status allowed the relations between the societies to deteriorate, 
leaving little room for any compromise. It is time to reverse this approach and make the 
improvement of relations a priority. This process has already started, but it is moving slowly because 
of the lack of political support and resources. Since the number of stakeholders that would benefit 
from improved relations is large, it should be feasible to conduct a thorough analysis of the conflict, 
develop a long-term strategy, align the resources and proceed to integrate them into the peace 
process. Actors who would benefit from the improvement of relations, but who might be under 
political pressure at home not to cooperate, such as the governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia, 
could at least agree not to hinder the peace process. 
The US and EU, in cooperation with Azerbaijani and Armenian civil societies, as parties with 
substantial material and human/professional resources and interest in building a lasting peace in the 
Caucasus, could be the catalysts of a coordinated peace effort. Existing moderate strains within the 
Azerbaijani and Armenian media and academic communities have to be cultivated and cooperation 
among them encouraged. Moderate intellectuals’ access to local and international peace-building 
NGOs, media and education have to be promoted so they can communicate alternative views of 
cooperation based on a shared Caucasian identity, history, interests and security concerns. The 
Armenian and the Azerbaijani governments should be continuously consulted to ensure that the 
strategy does not contradict their interests. If the governments signal support for such a strategy or at 
least make it clear that they are not against it, then Georgia, the oil companies and local business 
communities could play a larger role in non-security related long-term projects intended to foster 
regional, cultural and economic cooperation. Excluding Russia would provoke an economic crisis 
near the northern boundaries of the Caucasus, could undermine the rising stability and could provoke 
Russia to directly sabotage the peace process. However, if the inclusion of Russia in the peace 
process proves to be impossible, methods should be found to reduce its influence in the conflict.9 
As relations between the societies improve, the role of the moderates in both will grow, the 
people will fear less for their lives and ethnic identity as a result of a political agreement, and 
hundreds of thousands of refugees will be able to return to their homes. The fear of Russia and 
Turkey attacking will decrease. Economic conditions will improve. Co-existence will become 
possible; the zero-sum vision will recede and compromise will stop being perceived as a destruction 
                                               
9 As noted above, the influence of Russia and Iran is conditional upon their alliance with Armenia, which needs 
them to counterbalance the perceived treat of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and the NATO alliance. Therefore, 
if Armenia was better integrated into the projects of regional economic and security cooperation, and if Turkey 
and NATO became strategic allies and not strategic threats, the necessity of Russian and Iranian support, and, as 
a result, their unconditional influence over the region would decrease, forcing them to adopt more cooperative 
and less coercive positions.  
of identity. Only then can the sides try to improve the format of negotiations. The leadership of 
Nagorno-Karabakh should be invited to the negotiating table and alternative mediation efforts 
considered. Then a sustainable agreement that has a chance of being accepted and implemented by 
the societies can be produced.  
 
Scholarship  
 The bulk of the literature on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which varies from open propaganda 
to pseudo-theoretical and theoretical analysis, has been written mostly in the last two decades by 
scholars, journalists, and policymakers who are usually of Armenian or Azerbaijani origin.10 All the 
mainstream Armenian and Azerbaijani media, both in the region and diaspora, also represent this 
trend. What unites this literature, from the point of view of the author, is that even the literature that 
is academically sound, such as  Chorbajian (2001) and Nassibli (Mollazade 1993), focuses on 
legitimizing the position of their side and disregards even the most basic needs and interests of the 
other side.    
Azerbaijani writers focus on the right of a state to preserve its territorial integrity and portray 
Armenia as a military aggressor aiming to seize Azerbaijani territories. They write that as a result of 
past aggression, Armenia occupies Nagorno-Karabakh and territories outside its borders. They also 
claim that over a million of Azerbaijanis have become refugees or IDPs after ethnic cleansings. They 
often mention UN resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Armenian military from the occupied 
territories and from Nagorno-Karabakh and the return of refugees to their homes before Nagorno-
Karabakh’s status can be discussed. After the Armenian forces withdraw, Azerbaijan is supposed to 
discuss the possibility of granting Nagorno-Karabakh the highest status of self-government within 
                                               
10 The analysis of sources in this article is limited to the English language literature or literature translated into 
English.  
the structure of the Azerbaijani state, the form and degree of which are not specified and must be 
worked out in the course of negotiation. They believe that according to international law, Azerbaijan 
should preserve its territorial integrity within the borders of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. 
This question is not subject to negotiation. The concerns of Armenians are not addressed, including 
such vital ones as the security of NK Armenians returning to Azerbaijani rule. The grievances that 
led to the war, such as the discrimination against the Armenian population under the Soviet 
Azerbaijan, are not addressed or are deemed lies to justify the aggression.  
  Armenian writers usually advocate for the right for self-determination of the population of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. They believe that Azerbaijani rulers have actively discriminated against the 
Armenian population in NK and that the survival of Armenian identity and culture is in danger. They 
insist that according to international law, Nagorno-Karabakh must be recognized as a lawfully 
formed independent state or part of the Armenian Republic. In particular, they argue that there were 
no legal grounds for the inclusion of NK in Azerbaijan and that it was a deliberate decision by 
Stalin. Even from the legal point of view, they argue, the declaration of Nagorno-Karabakh 
independence conformed to the existing USSR laws and was implemented on the basis of a 
referendum conducted in the presence of international observers. Those writers usually reject any 
possibility of restoring Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction over Nagorno-Karabakh. Some stress that 
Armenians won a military victory over Azerbaijan and this fact must be taken into account when 
formulating a solution. They also blame Azerbaijan for discrimination and aggression against the 
peaceful Armenian population of NK. The vital concerns of the Azerbaijanis, including the faith of 
hundreds of thousands of IDPs, as well as the Azerbaijani community of the NK, are not discussed.  
Both Armenian and Azerbaijani authors often use rhetorically charged language. They have 
very similar approaches to the conflict: every positive feature is attributed to their side and every 
negative feature to the other. The conflict is seen from an adversarial point of view. The Armenian 
side usually blames Azerbaijani ill-will and the Azerbaijani side blames Armenian ill-will for the 
failure of the peace process. They are united in their critique of the international community’s 
inability to deliver a just solution, the Armenian version of which, obviously, is the opposite of the 
Azerbaijani one. These writings suggest ways to reinforce the leverage of one side vis-à-vis the 
other, usually by trying to attract the sympathies or interests of international actors, and to force the 
other side to concede. Those approaches look for a win-lose outcome in which one side will gain 
everything and the other will lose it all.   
The limited, yet emerging, research on Armenian or Azerbaijani identity and its role in the 
conflict falls into this category. Even if it does not have explicit political aims, this anthropological 
literature is subjective, focuses on the needs of one’s own identity, explores the myths and confirms 
the role of the other as a historical enemy and a challenge to its own identity. In spite of this, some of 
the identity research does meet high academic standards and its mere presence should be considered 
as great progress in understanding the conflict and the relations between Azerbaijani and Armenian 
societies.  
Another trend in the literature includes authors who tend to take a neutral or objective stance, 
and also look at the conflict from a zero-sum point of view. Abasov and Khachatrian, Croissant, 
Carley, Crocker, Hampson and Aall and many others see the source of intractability in the objective 
unfavorable context, conflicting interests of external actors, ancient hatreds, internal politics of 
conflicting parties, mutually exclusive claims, and security dilemmas. The most common solutions 
that these authors regularly propose are various schemes for granting Nagorno-Karabakh a degree of 
autonomy within the formal jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. Mediators have often adopted those options 
as a basis of official negotiations and they have not led to any results. Another option, first proposed 
by Andrey Sacharov in 1988 and then developed by Paul Goble is the so-called “territorial swap.” 
This option proposes handing over Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia along with the territory that 
unites those two in exchange for transferring the Armenian territory between the Azerbaijan 
Republic and its autonomous region of Nakhchivan to Azerbaijani control. According to information 
in the media and opposition figures in Armenia, some variant of territorial exchange like the one 
proposed by Goble was seriously considered during presidential talks in 2000-2001 in Key West, 
Florida. Officially, Yerevan and Baku refuted these allegations and there was no additional 
information about it or confirmation that it was actually discussed. The other variant that political 
scientists often put forward is the “common state” or some kind of federation or confederation of 
Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan. This was offered to the conflicting sides as a solution in 1998 
by the co-chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group. Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia 
stated that they were ready to accept these proposals as a basis for negotiations. Meanwhile the 
Azerbaijani side rejected this idea and stressed that the confederation of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh will make the security and the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, with its population of seven 
million, dependent on Nagorno-Karabakh with only 150,000 inhabitants.  
These various compromises, although diverse, have something in common: they require 
painful concessions from both sides. They have been viewed by key stakeholders as offering ‘lose-
lose’ outcomes that dissatisfies both parties.  
Some literature moves away from the adversarial view and looks for a mutually beneficial 
solution. Laitin and Suny, Thomas De Waal, Phillips, Emerson and other scholars and practitioners 
represent this approach. They find many points of common interest and, with rare exception, tend to 
focus on positive dynamics and ignore objective threats and obstacles to their solutions. Some 
writers following this trend go as far as proposing a "Trans-Caucasian Confederation" that would 
unite Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in a common confederate state. The idea that the future of 
the South Caucasus countries lies in their integration is not new.11 But a group of researchers from 
the Center for Research of European Politics (Brussels) headed by Michael Emerson proposed a 
radical variant. He assumes that integration in itself may turn out to be a key to the solution for 
Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. This proposal, however, 
assumes the leaders of the three recognized states in the South Caucasus are ready to immediately 
take steps towards regional integration, the creation of the so-called South Caucasus community. It 
also assumes the consent of the EU, Russia and the US to sponsor such integration. However, the 
governments of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have shown negative reactions toward all of these 
ideas, and they have not generated any interest from the international community.  
A newly emerging trend in the literature on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict signals a clean 
break with existing literature in its way of thinking about conflicts. The authors representing this 
trend are process, rather than outcome, oriented and approach conflict resolution as a long-term road 
toward the improvement of relations. This trend is represented in reports by conflict resolution 
organizations, such as the International Crisis Group (October 2005) and the younger generation of 
Azerbaijani and Armenian social scientists who studied conflict resolution or some related social 
science discipline with an emphasis on conflict resolution. The authors of this issue of International 
Negotiation -- Tabib Husynov, Aytan Gahramanova, Irina Ghaplanyan, Ruben Harutunian, Phil 
Gamaghelyan and others -- represent that trend. The philosophy and position of these authors on 
                                               
11 It is sufficient here to recall the term “the Caucasian Benelux” coined by Eduard Shevardnadze as far back as 
the first half of the 1990s. 
 
many issues, including the status of NK, greatly differ from one another, and many are not much 
different from that of the most hard-line writers. What unites these authors, however, and what 
differentiates them from others, is that they break with the tradition of looking for a quick solution to 
the conflict and instead try to look beyond the established boundaries of conventional approaches. 
All of them put a great emphasis on the analysis and better understanding of the conflict and its 
dynamics. These authors try to understand the needs of all the parties involved and look for a 
sustainable solution that will take these needs into consideration. The following paragraph from the 
International Crisis Group’s 2005 report summarizes some of these authors’ concerns. 
Restoring confidence betweens Azerbaijanis and Armenians living in and around Nagorno-Karabakh will 
be a huge challenge, requiring transformation of the language, images and modes of dialogue they use with 
reference to the other. Political leaders, media, and educational sources in Armenia, and even more so in 
Azerbaijan, demonize each other, calling for revenge and appealing to people's sense of victimization 
without calling on them to consider their responsibility in the conflict. To prepare the population for a 
peace deal and implement it, new symbols and rhetoric with respect to the conflict are needed (International 
Crisis Group 2005). 
In terms of suggestions for conflict resolution, all focus on the development of a long-term peace 
process that could transform the relations between the societies and make sustainable co-existence of 
Azerbaijanis and the Armenians possible. Many mention that accepting the other’s grievances with 
as legitimate is an important first step in looking for a solution and that lasting peace requires 
reconciliation between the societies, not only among politicians and elites. Some emphasize the 
central role of identity in the perpetuation of the conflict.  All of them stress the necessity of 
involving civil societies in the peace process. Some authors also write about the necessity of 
including the people who are the most directly affected by the conflict, the Armenians and the 
Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh.  
This analysis of the literature shows a direct correlation between the trends that dominate the 
scholarship at any given time and the development of the conflict itself. In the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the literature was almost exclusively developed by the supporters of one side or the other and 
who favored and tried to legitimize a clear ‘win-lose’ outcome. This period was followed by the 
onset of violence and war. In the early and mid-1990s, the conflict attracted the attention of the 
international social science community, mainly political scientists and policy researchers who 
studied it from the traditional realpolitik point of view and offered a number of lose-lose outcomes; 
they urged both sides to compromise and make painful concessions. These ideas largely informed 
the negotiating process, but failed to produce an outcome, as they continuously dissatisfied both 
parties. It was only later that conflict resolution experts, mostly those focused on interest-based 
conflict resolution, joined the debate and offered what they considered a number of win-win 
possibilities. Their proposals tried to find a political solution that would satisfy both parties. Some of 
the proposals have been presented to the Armenian and the Azerbaijani presidents by the Minsk 
group co-chairs during negotiations, but so far no political solution has been devised that would 
satisfy both sides.  
Most of the literature, if not extremely biased, has contained both useful findings and 
deficiencies. The proponents of the ‘lose-lose’ approach considered the cooperative approach naïve 
and did not use its obvious advantages, while the partisans of the win-win approach often refused to 
see the objective threats of imprudent cooperation. What unites all authors is the constant search for 
a final political solution. All possible solutions have been on the negotiating table at one time or 
another and all of them have failed to bring the conflict to an end.  
However, the discussion of identity, let alone identity-based conflict resolution, has been 
virtually nonexistent until recently. It is no surprise, therefore, that identity matters as well as all 
other nonpolitical components of the conflict have not been addressed in the negotiations to date.  
In the last few years, a number of US and European-educated Azerbaijani and Armenian social 
scientists started gradually filling this gap. Research on identity and its influence on the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict, the role of civil society, on collective memory and transmitted trauma and other 
factors is growing. Various experts increasingly approach the resolution of the conflict less as an 
outcome and more as a process. This process requires a long-term vision and commitment and a 
comprehensive understanding of all the underlying needs and factors, not only the political ones. It 
must involve continuous assessment and reassessment of the ever-changing context, political and 
economic factors and identity needs. So far, this new trend of scholarship has been limited and quite 
marginal, but it is gaining currency. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has produced a number of 
reports stressing the need to improve relations. Mediators have adopted some of these principles and 
the negotiations seem increasingly focused on putting the status issue on hold and considering long-
term steps toward normalizing relations.  
Because there has been a strong correlation between the scholarship on this conflict and the 
peace process, there is hope that the mainstreaming and growth of this latest trend can inform the 
peace process. The abovementioned experts have already demonstrated the ability to self-organize 
and cooperate across conflict lines. A concerted effort to increase conflict-sensitive research in the 
fields of sociology, anthropology, social psychology, political science, and history, as well as the 
applied fields of international development and journalism, can produce a breadth of knowledge and 
more experts that are able to contribute to the transformation.   
 
Conclusions  
First and foremost, a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the conflict is necessary. The areas 
that require further assessment should be identified and the relevant research should be initiated. 
Conferences that will provide Armenian, Azerbaijani and foreign experts from various fields with 
forums to discuss the conflict on a regular basis should be established. These conferences would 
enhance the general understanding of the conflict as well its particular components. The conferences 
should be accompanied by smaller-scale workshops and joint research initiatives.  
The involvement of major policy-oriented think tanks from both countries in the peace process 
would help translate the generated knowledge into policy decisions. Contact with international 
mediators could be carried out on an even more direct level by inviting them to the workshops and 
conferences as observers. Once a basic understanding has been established, practical initiatives 
would follow. Local actors, including the NGOs, media and educators should be active in 
implementing the initiatives.  
Three themes – identity, politics and scholarship – have been analyzed here together because 
they all are pieces of the same puzzle. An understanding of any of the three will not be complete 
unless its relationship with the other two is established. Understanding and working on the political 
context is crucial as it is the driving force behind the conflict and attempts to resolve it. The 
emotional level, the identity one, is the central yet underappreciated component that fuels the ethnic 
hatred and mistrust. It affects the policy decisions just as much as relations between the societies. 
The ‘knowledge’ level, the scholarship, informs the feelings and actions. It is the foundation upon 
which policy makers base their decisions, both consciously and intuitively. Until now, unfortunately, 
their actions have been based on flawed knowledge and without awareness about the emotions 
involved and their influence over these actions. Understanding the link between these three can help 
greatly to improve the peace process. 
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